IMAGE AND IMAGERY IN IMAGINAL PSYCHOLOGY¹
(MENTAL IMAGE AND THEORY OF SCIENCE)

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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with theoretical concepts of image and imagery in foremost imaginal psychologists (James Hillman, Michael Vannoy Adams). Attributing primary epistemological status to image and imagery, archetypal/imaginal psychology school developed (both within philosophy and psychology) new theory of image and imagery, questioned older thesis about derivative and secondary epistemological status of image (image as imprint within human psyche, derivative of primary sensations). Using Jung’s concept of autonomous psyche of essentially archetypal nature, Hillman started to question Jung’s concept of “Self” as the central archetype that — for him — symbolized sort of disguised traditional monotheism (Christian God, Jewish Yahweh etc.) similarly to Freud’s sexuality (id) or central cultural myth (Oedipus myth). Archetypal/imaginal psychology defends essential sovereignty and equality of all images (liberty to imagine considers as the first and the most important liberty of human being) and imagery and resultant polytheist psychology. Such direction that took place within Jungian Studies and give birth to imaginal psychology coincided with the development in different fields: in philosophy and theory of science. Derrida’s and Feyerabend’s rejection of ultimate referential frame is not identical with but parallels Hillman’s and Vannoy Adam’s discovery of fantasy
rules of the psyche. This paper also discusses similarities and differences in Hillman and Feyerabend and their concepts of paradigmatical cultural shift from culture and science dominated by “monotheist psychology” to that dominated by “polytheist psychology” where all images are treated equally.

**KEYWORDS:** Mental Image(s); Reality; Epistemology; J. Hillman; M. V. Adams; Post-Jungians; Feyerabend; Theory of Science.

**RESUMO:** O seguinte artigo trata dos conceitos teóricos da imagem e da imaginação em psicólogos preeminentes da imaginação (James Hillman, Michael Vannoy Adams, Rafael López Pedraza). Atribuindo a primazia epistemológica a imagem e a imaginação, a escola da psicologia arquetípica desenvolveu a nova teoria da imagem e da imaginação, questionou a tese mais velha da natureza derivada e secundária do estatuto epistemológico da imagem (como impressão na psique humana, o derivado das sensações primárias). Usando o conceito da psique como entidade autônoma e de essência arquetipal do C. G. Jung, Hillman começou a questionar o conceito de “Self” como o arquetipo central que — no seu entender — simbolizou certa camuflagem do monoteísmo tradicional (Deus cristão, Javé judeu etc.) semelhante à sexualidade freudiana (id) ou ao mito central cultural (mito de Édipo). A psicologia arquetipal sustenta a soberania essencial de todas as imagens (liberdade de imaginar considera a primeira e a mais importante liberdade do ser humano), a imaginação e a psicologia poli-teista dela decorrente. Uma atitude assim evoca muitas questões não só no campo da psicologia (quanto individual tanto coletiva) mas também dentro da filosofia/teoria da ciência ou epistemologia.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Imagem Mental; Realidade; Epistemologia; J. Hillman; M. V. Adams; Pós-Junguianos; Feyerabend; Teoria da Ciência.
“The psyche creates reality everyday,” Jung says. “The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy.” If, as Jung succinctly says, “image is psyche” and if the psyche creates reality, then what creates reality is the image.

Michael Vannoy Adams

Today we know that imagery has the same importance or even more importance than other fundamental mental functions of human personality. Paul Kugler, for example, locates imagination in the basis of human self-consciousness, speaking, memory, dreaming, writing etc. Without that no art, no science or culture would be possible, and, certainly, there would be no humanness (KLUGER, 2008, p. 85). Nevertheless, during almost all the history of the West human imagery was considered epiphenomenon, sort of derivative and unessential secondary product of human mind. Starting with tradition of western epistemology (Plato) imaginary and image were considered misleading, vague entity, source of misunderstanding, vagueness, uncertainty, confusion. But imagery makes part of human nature and surely plays its role not just in subjective but also in external world of man. Taking imagery seriously is quite contemporary phenomena. Omitted and ignored by scientific disciplines, imagery was frequently restricted to art, religion, eventually to “pseudoscientific disciplines”. Tradition of western philosophy and suspicious attitude to imagery overlap almost from the very start of that tradition. Ironically, it was German rationalist philosopher Immanuel Kant, who initiated great liberating process of human imagery from its subjugation to rationality. His *einfühlungskraft* and after him European romanticist
movement finally led to admitting imagination its legitimate status both in human psyche, psycho-logy and in epistemology.

In following lines I shortly expound principle of rationality and material reality as an epistemological principle dominating for most part of Western history of ideas whose unshakable status started trembling already during 18th century with David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis industrial revolution and technological progress neither romanticist cultural revolution nor German Naturphilosophie did supersede rationalist, progressist and technological vein of the 19th century (ELLENBERGER, 1970, p. 224-228). Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis — considering unconscious merely derivate of conscious ego and inspired by natural sciences — remained faithful to what we could call reality principle and fantasy and that is why it viewed imagination with considerable suspicion. Jung, contrary to Freud, conceded to unconscious autonomy, independence, knowledge, and creativity which drew him nearer to German romanticist philosophers and to the idea that psyche is composed of images. Similarly to today’s post-Jungians he also referred to European romanticism and to Christian as well as pre-Christian thinkers who had valued spontaneously emerging mental images.

Different attitudes of Freud and Jung can be attributed to their different personalities but to their different relation to philosophy as well. Even though Jung had love-hate relationship with philosophy already as youth had became completely absorbed in history of ideas whereas Freud deliberately avoided reading philosophical texts (KLUGER, 2008, p. 85). In introductory pages of Psychological Types (1921) Jung presented quite extensive commentary to western history of ideas. Philosophically Jung
considered himself Kantian thinker — whereas Freud considered mental images representations of instincts, Jung conceived them as primary phenomena of autonomous psyche, i.e. entities similar to Kant’s *a priori* structures (time, space, number etc.). But Kantian subject could not envisage collective unconscious or unconscious processes. Here the missing link between Kant and Jung offer German romanticists, *naturphilosophie* or Arthur Schopenhauer. While Jung did not refer to Hegel, he did so very often to Hegel’s rival Schopenhauer. It seems that it is just Schopenhauerian influence that overarches Kantian (Enlightened) and Freudian (psychoanalytic) influence in Jung. It could be even said that Schopenhauer was that kindred kind of philosopher who fits into Jung’s idea of philosophy and philosophizing sufficiently bonded with life itself. Moreover, if we take into consideration that Jung was one of those few thinkers exceptionally imaginal and pictorial in their cognitive processing, he certainly found in Schopenhauer important ally. Schopenhauer was one of those few philosophers who paid attention to dreams, mental images and imagery. The very title of Schopenhauer’s masterpiece *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Idea) from 1819 reveals how much attention he paid to human imagery. “Vorstellung” is sometimes translated as “idea” but literally means “placed before” and better could be translated as “representation”. By “vorstellung” Schopenhauer means phenomena, representations emerging from unconscious and identified or intuited as images. Whatever philosophical concept or work of art is preceded by mental images. As writer Schopenhauer repeatedly used his mental images and imagery — just like Jung. According to Schopenhauer both for artist and philosopher imagery is in-between that could enlarge subjective consciousness beyond particular objects or images to “timeless
subjects of knowing” (1958, p. 199): Urbilder or Musterbilder, “prototypes” or “archetypes”. In this Schopenhauer is Platonic philosopher (after all not just once referred to “divine Plato”).

Schopenhauer was one of those thinkers who intuited existence of unconscious dimension of human subjectivity. Together with romanticist pioneers of depth psychology (C.G.Carus, G. H. von Schubert, I.G.V. Troxler, G.T.Fechner or J. J. Bachofen) and romanticist artists were also one of great de-constructors of enlightened subject: “Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths inasmuch as he extends his denial even to our formal knowledge — a point in which he has been brilliantly rectified by Kant …”.

Jung’s psychology is an example of synthesis of Enlightened (rationalist) and romanticist (irationalist) tradition. Even though Jungian archetype can be similar to innate ideas, Jung highlights that archetypes equate innate ideas. These are forms, non-actualized potentialities of ideas and images, that must be first actualized by means of experience. According to Jung archetypes can be understood as “innate possibilities of ideas”, they are “similar to the Kantian categories”: “give definitive form to contents of themselves, they give definitive form to contents that have already been acquired” by means of experience (1970b, p. 10-11).

BEYOND REFERENTIALITY: KANT, DERRIDA, JUNG

As it was suggested above, Kant was linear ancestor of Jung’s structuralist concept. Confronted with Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism, in the first edition of Die Kritik der Reinen Vernunft Kant emphasized autonomous nature of human mind in the cognition process: reason and perceptions are produced by imagery (Einbildungskraft). Till then mental imagery was conceived as 1) reproductive and 2) located in conscious. Conceiving mental images as primary creative
phenomena of human mind and placing synthetic a priori categories beyond human reason, Kant revolutionized both relation between reason and mental imaging and approach to process cognition and thinking. Shortly, imaging is necessary precondition of all the knowledge. Kant’s liberation of image was later exploited by new romanticist movements in different parts of Europe and later, in the beginning of 20th century, Sigmund Freud immersed himself to the study of fantasies, dreams and associations. In Freud notion of “human subject” spanned till then merely intuited dimension. It was not until Jung discovered autonomous dimension of psyche and its images as the source of human experiences. Its capacity to produce images started to be considered intermediary between ego-consciousness and the world of outer and inner objects. Thus mental imaging got completely new role and changed also concept of so-called reality. It does not rest in Platonic eternal ideas, transcendent divinity or matter any more. Reality became function of psychic imaging. Thus, human life consists in psychic images, and experience of reality results from psyche’s capacity to produce images.

The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy … Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is, pre-eminently …[a] creative activity. (JUNG, 1970a, p. 51-52).

Experiencing inner and outer world takes place in images whose source transcends conscious psyche. “Reality” thus got paradoxical quality. First, it resulted from psyche’s capacity to produce images, secondly, imagery became place of origin of meaning (whereas during most part of Western philosophy tradition the ontological status of imagery was derivative).
Approximately in the middle of the 20th century post-modern critique of Western epistemology was introduced in continental philosophy. Then Foucault and Derrida focused on the old problem of fundamental platform of act of interpretation. In other words they opened old question of metaphysical background of act of interpretation. Ancient and medieval philosophy understood universals as referring to ultimate transcendent reality. Much like reproductive theory of images referred to transcendent/metaphysical idea/form/archetype. Reproductive theory of image was fundamentally shaken by Hume who led it *ad abdurdum*, thus removed all metaphysical scaffolding and exposed it to epistemological solipsism. Derrida did something similar with the language: started questioning reproductive concept of language and removed its reference to ultimate/transcendent “reality” whatsoever.

If Hume inquired for “reality” behind inner and outer images, Derrida inquired for “reality” behind language. Like that medieval dispute between realism (referential models of “reality”) and nominalism (there are no universals) was renewed. With Derrida, post-modern inheritor of medieval nominalists, it became evident that if we withdraw from supposed referentiality (reproductivity) of words, we cannot go behind text and so find ourselves in solipsism. Derrida’s text is solipsist text and is analogous to Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism: Derrida’s post-modern deconstruction does not refer to ultimate meaning as well as Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism.

Hume’s epistemological scepticism led Kant to radical change of perspective. Kant left extreme assumptions (referentiality and fictionalism) and overarched them by means of his transcendentalism. Leaving traditional perspective of the Western epistemology (referentialism: our mode of cognition must conform to object of experience), Kant introduced
extra-conscious platform of human psyche (innate \textit{a priori} categories) which makes all human experience possible and which is universal (empirical rules could not guarantee universality). Together with such epistemological model Kant introduced two modes of knowledge: 1) things as phenomena (experienced) and 2) things as \textit{noumena} (things as they are in themselves, inaccessible to our knowledge). In fact, concept of noumena was posited only negatively to set limits of human reason. Although Kant did not use concept of conscious and unconscious mind, Jung’s extended delicate implications of \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft} and applied it to his model (archetypes conceived as a priori categories of human psyche). In Jung Kantian a priori categories became “\textit{innate possibilities of ideas}” that are “\textit{similar to Kantian ideas}”. However, Jung stressed that archetype understood neither as idea nor as image but as a disposition to certain images and ideas and clearly discerned between archetype and archetypal image. Whereas archetype in itself is somehow unknowable core that “\textit{never was conscious and never will be ... it was, and still is, only interpreted}” (JUNG, 1970d, p. 266), archetypal representations (i.e. images and ideas) are “\textit{mediated as by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied ... and point back to one essential \textit{irrepresentable} basic form. The latter is characterised by certain formal elements and by certain fundamental meanings, although these can only be grasped approximately}” (JUNG, 1970c, p. 25).

Concept of archetype \textit{an sich} as it was posited in 1940s attracted attention because it gave psychology fundamental status similar to that of biology, neurology and other disciplines. As a consequence, in post-war period number of experts started dealing with analogies between Jungian archetypal theory and other disciplines’ theories (SAMUELS, 1985, p.
26-43). Meanwhile influenced by post-Freudian revisions and critiques, psychoanalysis started coming to the conclusion, that positions of Jungian school and psychoanalysis converge.¹⁰

**BEYOND STRUCTURAL CONCEPT OF PSYCHE**

Today’s post-Jungians embrace Jung as structuralist (ADAMS, 2004c, p. 41-56; KLUGER, 2008, p. 77-91; SHAMDASANI, 2003) and as it was stated above, they often underscore that Jung anticipated convergency of analytical psychology and various Freudian schools of psychoanalysis, that took “structural theory” as one of their perspectives (ADAMS, 2004c, p. 41-56). Jungian tradition has its structural theory too. Jungian structural theory describes relations between “persona”, “ego”, “shadow”, “anima”, “animus” and “Self”. Already during Jung’s life a question of structure or hierarchy of archetypes was intensely discussed. One of eminent Jungian psychologist Edward F. Edinger understands dynamics of psyche as produced by bi-polar nature of psyche: ego-Self axis,¹¹ other authors distinguish four types of archetypes: 1) “shallow” archetypes (persona and shadow), 2) “archetypes of sex”, 3) “archetypes of spirit” (old wise man and crone) and finally 4) Self (SAMUELS, 1985 p. 31-32). Also bi-polarity of archetypes (ego/self, conscious/unconscious, personal/collective, extraversion/introversion, rational/irrational, Eros/Logos, image/instinct) seems to imply concept of archetypes and structuralist concept.

In post-war period structural concepts enjoyed vast applications in social sciences and in psychoanalysis as well. At that time Jung’s followers and experts from different disciplines (biology, neurology, etc.) started looking for
common field of study that could enable grasp archetype and its manifestations in different disciplines as well. Within Jungian tradition itself critical distance towards Jung took place not until James Hillman’s Terry lectures at Yale University (1972) and his *Re-Visioning Psychology* (1975). Hillman started questioning structuralist perspective and assumed critical attitude to Jung. Andrew Samuel’s labelling “post-Jungian(s)” refers exactly to this attitude (till then unprecedented): “I have used the term post-Jungians in preference to Jungian to indicate both connectedness to Jung and distance from him” (1985 p. 19). Michael Vannoy Adams and Andrew Samuels exemplified that in Hillman’s approach to some of Jung’s own concepts. For example Samuels notes that in Hillman’s *Re-Visioning Psychology* there is no entry for “self” in the index: he “little says about the self” (1985, p. 107). It seems to me, that it was probably the first step to break-up with structural perspective within Jungian psychology. But such a process was inevitably intertwined with the process of more radical liberating of image within Jungian field of study. Hillman’s attack upon what is called “ego-self axis” was not just attack upon idea of “privileged” or “superior” images, but also attack upon Platonic idea of hierarchy of archetypes/images and tendency to impose theoretic (including structural) concepts. It led Hillman to some objections towards contemporary psychology and its philosophical and cultural underpinnings.

DE-CENTRED — POLY-CENTRED — POLY-THEIST PSYCHE

Some have considered Jung’s most important discovery to be the psychological complex, others the archetype, but perhaps his main contribution lies not so much in these
ideas as in his radical, personified formulation of them. (...) whereas philosophers had conceived such forces as mental events, Jung described them as persons. Jung harked back to Renaissance, Hellenic, and archaic thought forms. James Hillman

Hillman does not understand archetypes structurally, does not order them in sort of hierarchy. Hillman himself (as well as Jung before him) speaks about “Self” as about abstract concept imposed in psyche from without and to proceed in Re-Visioning he has to repudiate “dogma of self-domination” because Self literally gained control of Jungian psychology. According to Hillman theory of personality should start with dream and dream images because human being is “primarily an imagemaker and our psychic substance consists of images; our being is imaginal being, an existence in imagination. We are indeed such stuff as dreams are made on” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 23). For Hillman Jung’s main contributions consist in his approach to mental images, i.e. in personification. Personification played very important role already in Freud. Paradoxically it was not “restored as a valid idea through classics or philosophy (...) but in the consulting room and the insane asylum” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 17). It was psychopathology that led Freud and after him Jung to the idea of psyche’s propensity to personify. Hillman notes that Freud’s basic “structural notions” as the Censor, the Superego, the Primal Horde or the Primal Scene, concepts like Eros, Thanatos or Oidipus complex are in fact personifications. Nevertheless, for Hillman Freud’s psychoanalysis proved to be mere translation of one kind of images into another ones: ancient personified images were translated into another fantasy (this time formulated in so-called objective and neutral language of numbers and structures
which was believed to be “objective” and “scientific”, i.e. non-imaginal, non-mythological). In fact Freud’s psychoanalysis provided psyche with another scene for personifications and mythologizations. As a result, Freud’s psyche continues speaking in her own way about herself as it did in ancient times: “a mythic manner of speaking is fundamental to the soul’s way of formulating itself.” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 20). Whereas Freud enacted new “psychoanalytic” mythology without being aware of that, Jung risked his reputation of scientist, took very innovating and dangerous step and “reverted courageously to the direct mode of personifying which in his day was still considered a primitive formulation” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 21).17 Whereas philosophers before him described such psychic forces as mental phenomena, Jung resorted to archaic method — and personified them.

Acceding to mythic manner of speaking Jung dared opening vast space or — perhaps better said — broader view of psyche. Personification became Jung’s fundamental method of approaching psyche. Working with word associations, active imagination, discovering autonomous autonomous complexes he started using personification as a method of approaching nature of psyche.

What is personification? It is a psychic process or “mode of thought” upon which anthropomorphism or animism rests, thus it forms basis of ancient mythologies, dreams, fantasies. Hillman defines it as “mode of thought’ which takes an inside event and puts it outside, at the same time making this content alive, personal, and even divine” (1997, p. 12). As stated above, Jung used it as a method of approaching psyche (not just modern white psyche of Europeans but also psyche of black Africans, Afro-Americans or ancient psyche of pre-modern cultures of the world).

Nevertheless Jung approached psyche with certain philosophical presumptions which resulted from his neo-Kantian position. It is likely that his philosophical presumptions
resulted from what Hillman calls “monotheist culture” of the
West as well (1997, p. 168). According to Hillman majority of
theoretical disciplines of the western thought is traditionally
obsessed by unified models because modern psyche (including
modern secularized psyche) comes out from monotheist
tradition. Both Freud and Jung make part of it: “The monotheistic
model may be overtly religious, as is Jung’s self, or disguised,
as in Freud attempt at a comprehensive system. Organicism,
holism, unified-field theory, monistic materialism, and other
psychologies express their fundamental monism through
insistence upon clarity, cohesion, or wholes” (1997, p. 35).

If Jung accepted psyche’s propensity to personify and thus
got nearer to its mythological, imaginal basis. Hillman took step
beyond Jung and firmly sticks on the image as a fundamental
product of psyche. His programmatic motto “stick to the image”
leads him to radical de-construction and de-monotheization
of psyche. If we deprive psyche of strict monopoly of rational
ego, we enter the vast space of polycentrism, i.e. number of
images that — according to Hillman — should be neither
hierarchized nor structured. Even ego-complex Hillman
considers ego-image — one of many other mental images.
In this way Hillman de-centralizes (that is de-structures
or de-constructs) psyche and opens the new perspective
that enables us to view “lower layers of psyche”¹⁸ (archaic,
mythological, polycentric layers of psyche): “Myth offers the
same kind of world. It too is polycentric, with innumerable
personifications in imaginal space. Just as dream images are
not mere worlds in disguise (...) so the ancient personifications
of myths are not concepts in disguise.” (1997, p. 33-34).

Hillman is aware of extremity of his perspective, he even
admits that majority of psychology schools must view it as
pathological: “this movement of consciousness into psychological reality is experienced at first as pathological; things fall apart as the one becomes many. Recognition of the multiple persons of the psyche is akin to the experience of multiple personality. Personifying means polycentrity, implicating us in a revolution of consciousness — from monotheistic to polytheistic” (1997, p. 35).

This shift has also other consequences which I am going to deal with further in the paper. For Hillman archetypal perspective (or soul-making perspective) is the same as polytheist perspective — not in the theological sense but such a perspective enables get across diversity of the soul, refuses monotheist prejudice (that dominates our habitual everyday psychology) and implies radical relativism. In this spirit is all his book Re-Visioning of Psychology: de-literalizing and on the contrary figuratization of reality. In other words put an end to reality principle and substitute it with fantasy principle or as Vannoy Adams says, make Mr. Reality up for Mr.Fantasy (2004a).

Thus, Hillman already in 1970s proposed post-structural Jungian theory. It was natural consequence of his programmatic motto “stick to the image” and another revolutionary step in liberating images within modern western psyche. In one of his latest works Michael Vannoy Adams defends imaginal/post-Jungian psychology leaving behind post-structural perspective: “Does Jungian analysis need a structural theory? Or can it do very well without one? I maintain that there is little to be lost and much to be gained if Jungian analysis dispenses entirely with the structural theory of the persona, ego, shadow, anima or animus, and Self — and relies instead on a post-structural theory.” (2004c, p. 40). Today, 60 years after Jung’s death, it seems that “Hillmanian perspective”
views psyche as an with natural propensity to personify, to mythologize and to produce images. At the same time they believe that psyche tends to divide in many parts and images.

ENSOULED WORLD AND THEORY OF SCIENCE

William James says that the distinction between pluralism and monism is “the most pregnant of all dilemmas of philosophy”. James asks: “Does reality exist distributively? or collectively? — in the shapes of eaches, everys, anys, eithers? Or only in the shape of an all or whole?”

Michael Vannoy Adams

Hillman refuses imposition of psychologico-philosophical pre-conceptions on human psyche. Already above exposed Hillman’s perspectives and positions makes him to protest against invasive conduct of psychology toward what he calls world, soul or, better, ensouled world. For him it was mechanicist and rationalist dogmatizer Descartes who “banished the psyche at the beginning of our modern period” (1997, p. 10):

Also basic to this modern view of persons is the psychology of Descartes; it imagines a universe divided into living subjects and dead objects. There is no space for anything intermediate, ambiguous, and metaphorical. (...) This is a restrictive perspective (...). Psychology, whose very name and title derives from soul, (psyché), has stopped soul from appearing in any place but where it sanctioned by this modern world view. Just as modern science and metaphysics have banned the subjectivity of souls from the outer world of material events, psychology has denied the autonomy
and diversity of souls to the inner world of psychological events. Intentions, behaviour, voices, feelings that I do not control with my will or cannot connect to with my reason are alien, negative, psychopathological. All my subjectivity and all my interiority must be literally mine, in ownership of my conscious ego-personality. At best we have souls; but no one says we are souls. Psychology does not even use the word soul: a person is referred to as a self or an ego. But the world out there and in here have gone through the same process of personification. We have all been desouled. (...) And so we must free the vision of the psyche from the narrow biases of modern psychology, enabling the psyche to perceive itself — its relations, its realities, its pathologies — altogether apart from psychology’s modern perspective. The modern vision of ourselves has stultified our imaginations. It has fixed our view of personality (psychology), of insanity (psychopathology), of matter and objects (science), of the cosmos (metaphysics), and of the nature of the divine (theology). Moreover it has fixed the methods in all these fields so that they present a unified front against soul. Some people in desperation have turned to witchcraft, magic and occultism, to drugs and madness, anything to rekindle imagination and find a world ensouled. But these reactions are not enough. What is needed is a revisioning, a fundamental shift of perspective out of that soulless predicament we call modern consciousness. (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 1-3).

Hillman’s demand of “fundamental shift of perspective” has, of course, its profound philosophical implications and echoes development in the area of theory/philosophy of science during the second half of the 20th century. Although Kuhn, Feyerabend, Bohm, Capra, or even Grof were not “champions of psyche” (as some of Hillman’s sympathizers call him) and did not share Hillman’s desirable perspective (soul-making)\textsuperscript{19}
they — from different perspectives but with similar arguments — argued against Newton-Cartesian paradigm as well, and opened the way to its overcoming or substitution. Supported by different currents of philosophy and foundings in different disciplines, in 1960s and 1970s post-Jungians seemed to stand on the threshold of a new chapter in the history of science.

Modern philosophy started discovering “objectivity problem” (“objective truth” problem) in science already at the turn of 19th and 20th century when many scientific theories were discredited.20 Such situation led to refutation of then widely accepted idea of science permanently separated from philosophy. Such tendencies encouraged already existing strong irrationalist and un-scientific/un-objectivist current in philosophy.21 Irrationalism of the 19th century responded to classical physics (based on Newton’s celestial mechanics and Euclidean geometry) whose foundations were entering process of crisis.22 Moreover, the principle of illustration started to disappear — shift from mechanicist concepts to quantum-relativist ones, study of subatomic cosmos, elementary particles, discovery of different levels of physical world with their own laws; all that made early 20th century science extremely abstract enterprise with big portion of human/subjective factor: imaginary! Idea of science permanently separated from philosophy had to be discarded and scientists started studying philosophical premises of their works. Subjectivist philosophers — Émile Boutroux for example — stressed human origin of natural laws and rejected idea of their absolute validity. After the World War II — with the the birth of historical school of philosophy of science (HOLZBACHOVÁ, 1996, p. 73) — a positivist notion of science was refused. It seems that it was Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) that marked definitive coup de


grâce to Newton-Cartesian tradition of Western rationality and accumulative notion of science. After Kuhn the problem of ultimate and “objective” truth was further relativized. Radical relavist and author of ground-breaking works, Paul K. Feyerabend in 1970s and 1980s represented radical extension of Kuhn’s theses. Feyerabend was probably aware — in Against Method (1975), Science in a Free Society (1978) and Farewell to Reason (1987) — of his extremely radical position. In my view, his ground-breaking works were supposed to destroy “dogma of rational/positivist/scientific God” or to demythize Western rationality and its institutions which paralleled Hillmanian destruction of “dogma of self-domination” as it was exposed in Re-Visioning published the same year. Those operations led to opening of unexpected free space and cross-science influence, wide theorizing about mutual influences science-society and even idea of science as plural or disunited entity:

Philosophers then concluded that the various forms of rationalism that had offered their services had not only produced chimaeras but would have damaged the sciences had they been adopted as guides. Here Kuhn’s masterpiece played a decisive role. It led to new ideas. Unfortunately it also encouraged a lot of trash. Kuhn’s main terms (‘paradigm’, ‘revolution’, ‘normal science’, ‘prescience’, ‘anomaly’, puzzle-solving’, etc.) turned up in various forms of pseudoscience while his general approach confused many writers: finding that science had been freed from the fetters of a dogmatic logic and epistemology they tried to tie it down again, this time with sociological ropes. That trend lasted well into the early seventies. (...) In sociology the attention to detail has led to a situation where the problem is no longer why and how ‘science’ changes but how it keeps together. Philosophers, philosophers
of biology especially, suspected for some time that there is not one entity ‘science’ with clearly defined principles but that science contains a great variety of (high-level theoretical, phenomenological, experimental) approaches and that even a particular science such as physics is but a scattered collection of subjects (...) each of containing contrary tendencies (...). For some authors this is not only a fact; it is also desirable. (FEYERABEND, 1993, p. x-xi).

Feyerabend was probably the most radical critic of previous philosophy of science whatsoever. In fact he radicalized Kuhn’s basic categories, untied theory of science from its previous rationalistic tradition, insisted on methodological freedom and used Kuhn’s concept of “incommensurability” in favour of peaceful coexistence of different scientific/pseudoscientific traditions within free society. Rejection of demarcation problem and acceptance of different scientific traditions as equal important as academic science may seem to make Feyerabend kindred spirit of Hillman’s polytheist psychology. But it can be question of Zeitgeist as well: Feyerabend’s theory of science and Hillman’s imaginal psychology originated at the same time and thus are imprint of that time. Even if there are considerable similarities\(^2\) (call for “fundamental shift of perspective”, Hillman’s liberty to imagine as fundamental human liberty and Feyerabend’s liberty to think within whatever scientific tradition), there are also considerable differences. Whereas Feyerabend is (regarding knowledge and its standing in society) radical democrat or egalitarian and anarchist (as far as scientific method is concerned), Hillman is firmly rooted in Jungian tradition, empirist and imagist following autonomy of psyche. Moreover, Feyerabend could not follow Hillmanian
soul-making perspective. There is also difference in the view at Western philosophical/scientific tradition which Hillman divides into two big counter-cultures according to their approach to images.\(^2\) And finally Feyerabend believes in scientific progress (even if not in positivist sense as a accumulation of findings but as a permanent shift from one paradigm to another one) whereas Hillmanian “progress” takes form of Jungian circumambulatio, i.e. form of circle, repeated and “eternal” walking around primary datas produced by unconscious, i.e. mental images, walking around the same/similar motives (in dreams, visions, associations, everyday situations) and like that engage conscious personality with its unconscious counterpart. Because psyche is made primarily of images and not of intellectual concepts, Hillman does not look for intellectual certainty but works with metaphors, ambiguity, fictions, does not believe intellectual constructions a does not look for. However as he himself states, such posture has its intellectual justification:

Les us recall here what Paul Ricoeur said in his Terry Lectures: ‘Enigma does not block understanding but provokes it ...That which arouses understanding is precisely the double meaning, the intending of second meaning in and through the first’. Moreover we have at our side in this stance against definition a responsible rationalist, Karl Popper, who writes that ‘outside mathematics and logic problems of definability are mostly gratuitous. We need many undefined terms whose meaning ... will be changeable. But this is so with all concepts, including defined ones, since a definition can only reduce the meaning of the defined term to that of the undefined terms.’ And ‘...all definitions must ultimately go back to undefined terms’. Perhaps our recourse to
ignotum per ignotius is no mere mercurial trick of the alchemist, no mystification at all, but has indeed its intellectual justification (HILLMAN, 1997, p.152-153).

Imaginal psychology operates on completely different terrain and progress or “expansion” understands just as an “expansion of consciousness” taking place on ego-unconscious axis, i.e. as a result of conscious-unconscious dialogue. That is a work — as Himself says — that takes place behind scientific and intellectual concepts and definitions. That is what he calls “seeing through” intellect:

The infinite regress of psychologizing, its interiorizing process from visible to invisible which we have just described (...) — this infinite regress here comes to rest because here it meets the permanent ambiguity of metaphors (...). For these intellectual concepts, like all intellectual concepts, ‘rest’ or find ‘permanent ground’ and ‘base’ in metaphor and can only be ‘established’ by consent of metaphor. It is the imaginal that gives certainty to our intellectual sureties, augmenting the intellect the beyond itself (...) to connote and imply and suggest always more than its terms would denote. For the intellectual too expresses fantasies that are rooted in myths, and these fantasies can be exposed by the psychologizing eye of the soul. Nunquam enim satiatur oculus visu, said Cusanus. ‘The eye, as a sense organ is never satiated nor limited by anything visible; for the eye can never have too much of seeing; likewise, intellectual vision is never satisfied with of the truth ...The striving for the infinite, the inability to stop at anything given or attained is neither a fault nor a shortcoming of the mind; rather it is the seal of its divine origin and of its indestructibility’ (HILLMAN, 1997, p.153-154)
Feyerabend would have certainly accepted all those archaic scientific systems, both ancient and modern oracular techniques, theories and practices as equal to Western science. He does not speak about psychological transference or participation mystique in primitive mentality but aware of fragmented consciousness of Ancients (as expressed in their mythologies and religious life) and their live in plurality of different or inconsistent images was really human. After analyzing Homeric world Feyerabend argues in favour of plural, dis-united, fragmented, non-dogmatic, pluri-sided outer and inner world (or its image?) as he sees it in old Greek myths, religion, science and culture:

To sum-up: the archaic world is much less compact that the world that surrounds us, and it is also experienced as being less compact. Archaic man lacks ‘physical’ unity, his ‘body’ consists of a multitude of parts, limbs, surfaces, connections; and he lacks of ‘mental’ unity, his ‘mind’ is composed of variety of events, some of them not even ‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside. Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangement sof parts into which the body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place. This is the world-view that emerges from an analysis of the formal features of ‘archaic’ art and Homeric poetry. (...). Further evidence for the conjecture can be obtained from an examination of ‘meta-attitudes’ such as general religious attitudes and ‘theories’ of (attitudes to) knowledge. For the lack of compatness just described reappears in the field of ideology. There is a tolerance in religious matters which later generations found morally and theoretically unacceptable (...). Archaic man is a religious eclectic eclectic, he does not object to foreign gods and myths, and
he adds them to the existing furniture of the world without any attempt at synthesis, or removal of contradictions. There are no priests, there is no dogma, there are no categorical statements about the gods, humans, the world. (This tolerance can still be found with the Ionian philosophers of nature who develop their ideas side by side with myth without trying to eliminate the latter.) There is no religious ‘morality’ in our sense, nor the gods abstract embodiments of eternal principles. (...) This is how life was dehumanized by what some people are pleased to call “moral progress” or “scientific progress” (1993, p. 183-184).

Ellenberger touches the same question when writing about primitive psychotherapy and comparing between “primitive” and “scientific” medicine. In the table below there is basic classification of archaic diseases and their appropriate treatment (1970, p. 5).27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISEASE THEORY</th>
<th>THERAPY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Disease-object intrusion</td>
<td>Extraction of disease-object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Loss of soul</td>
<td>To find, bring back, and restore the lost soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Spirit intrusion</td>
<td>a) exorcism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) mechanical extraction of the foreign spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) transference of the foreign spirit into another living being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Breach of taboo</td>
<td>Confession, propitiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sorcery</td>
<td>Counter-magic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From different perspective and on the same terrain as Austrian-Californian Paul K. Feyerabend find themselves Czech-Californian psychologist of non-ordinary states of
consciousness Stanislav Grof\textsuperscript{28} or his colleague Richard Tarnas.\textsuperscript{29} From the perspective of history of human consciousness Jung considers mono-theism necessary and difficult progression from polytheism and polydemonism. Jung supposes that whatever (conscious) striving for mono-theism (religious, scientific etc.) automatically generates response on the other (unconscious and poly-theist) pole. Supposing that such dynamics works both on individual and collective level, postmodern stress on multiplicity and relativity should be understood as a psychologico-cultural reaction to longlasting mono-theist, one-sided conscious attitudes of Western societies across centuries. Even if we suppose that on fundamental level (unity of opposites: \textit{coniunctio oppositorum}) unity and multiplicity are indiscernible, post-Jungians consider psychological monotheism as utterly untenable:

If I am a “theist” at all, I am a “polytheist” — but only in the strictly psychological sense that Hillman employs the term. (...) I prefer the many-sidedness of polytheism to the one-sidedness of monotheism. This preference is not, however, simply a subjective predilection. I have what I regard as an objective basis for this preference. Because of the obvious, intrinsic diversity of the unconscious, monotheism seems to me utterly untenable psychologically. In my experience as a psychoanalyst, all of the evidence available to me from dreams, fantasies, and other material of my patients demonstrates conclusively that the psyche is not monistic but, as Samuel says, “plural” (ADAMS, 2004d, p. 217-218).

\begin{footnotesize}
\textbf{NOTAS}
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\textsuperscript{1}In this paper I follow two prominent imaginal psychologists and prefer term “imaginal psychology” to “archetypal psychology”. Although Hillman himself
started using term “archetypal psychology” in 1970, five years later (in Revisioning Psychology) espoused term “imaginal psychology” and declared himself imagist. M. Vannoy Adams justifies use of this term in these words: “What is distinctive about Jungian psychology, especially in the Hillmanian rendition of it, is that it is an imaginal psychology. Jungian psychology is as much a psychology of the imagination as it is a psychology of the unconscious. Hillman even says: ‘I tend to use ‘imagination’ instead of that word ‘unconscious’ ... not that there isn’t unconsciousness in us all the time’. (ADAMS, 2004a, p. 1-19).

3Henri Ellenberger considers founder of that philosophical current F.W. Schelling. Starting point of his philosophy is the assumption of fundamental identity of spiritual and material nature (both nature and spirit emerge from the same absolute and indissoluble unity: “Nature is visible Spirit, Spirit is invisible Nature”). Thus nature cannot be understood in terms of mechanical, determinist and physical concepts, but as an expression of profound spiritual laws and common spiritual principle (world soul: Weltseele). Quoting Leibbrand Ellenberger considers Schelling as a direct precursor of Jung (“C.G. Jung teachings in the field of psychology are not intelligible if they are not connected with Schelling”). Another inspirator of romanticist psychology was J.W. Goethe and his concepts of Urphänomene, All-Sinn etc. indicating profound (unconscious) unity of the world and man. Concept of Urphänomene is present not just in Jung (for instance animus and anima can be understood as embodiment of Goethe's urphänomene), but also in Freud (thesis of primordial patricide). (ELLENBERGER, 1970, p. 202-205).

5Such relation to philosophy Jung maintained all his life, however, in fact it had much more to do with his relation to/with philosophers that philosophy itself. In my view it can be explained just by referring to big degree of misunderstanding that he felt in communication with philosophers. Jarrett interprets such misunderstandings in following terms: “When the philosophers indulged in verbal acrobatics and logic-chopping, when their speculations cut loose from moorings of experience, he would cry out, ‘I am not philosopher, I am an empiricist, a phenomenologist’” (JARRET, 1981, p. 193-204). In another place Jung himself admits high degree of misunderstanding with philosophers: “I must confess that I am always faced with a difficulty when I discuss (the subject of
Good and Evil) with philosophers or theologians. I have the impression that they are not talking about subject-matter itself but only about words, about concepts that mean or indicate it. We allow ourselves so easily to be dazzled by words, we substitute words for the whole of reality.” (JUNG, 1960, p. 91-99).

Kant anticipated Jung in various respects. His a priori ordering of psyche anticipates Jung’s archetypes. At the beginning Kant differentiated between pure and empirical knowledge. He asserted that all knowledge starts with experience, but it is not derived from it (as was asserted by Locke). On the contrary, pure knowledge was supposed to rest in universal a priori notions (called categories as for example causality. According to Kant such an a priori law must be universal and not deduced from experience). In Jung’s model of psyche, archetypes (initially used term “primordial images”) determine our experience (“inborn disposition”, “dominants of experience”, “forms in which things can be perceived and conceived”) elementary structures of psyche. Nevertheless, Jung defined archetypes in different place and in different way, thus this notion became source of confusions and misunderstanding. Post-Jungian psychology considers both Jung’s and Freud’s philosophical starting points of neokantian structuralist (Freud’s phylogenetic “schemata” or phylogenetic “prototypes”) (SHAMDASANI, 2003, p. 69-70; ADAMS, 2008, p. 107-124).

In B. Eckman’s words “Despite Jung’s personal antipathy to Hegel’s writing, Jungian thought’s ultimate aims and vision of the universe are actually much closer to Hegel than to Hegel’s writing. Jungian thought’s ultimate aims and vision of the universe are actually much closer to Hegel than to Kant, and find in Hegel’s thought a more fitting philosophical ally”. Philosophical alliance with Kant constitutes for Jungians some fundamental problems. Jung and Jungians base their psychologizing on Kantian epistelomogy which makes part of Enlightenment tradition (Kant’s differentiation of subjective and objective cognition, procedure that Jung denominated as participation mystique between knower and known). In this respect Jung follows Kant’s epistemology. But Kant’s bifurcation of subject and object brought about problem — opened gulf between living knowing subject and passive unanimated object/world. “Even God in Kant’s scheme is not capable of bursting through the boundaries and limitations of human thought (...) God in Kant’s thought functions not as subject but as object — and to this extent at least is not alive but dead!” Eckmans pose the question: “If Jung’s conception of psychoid archetypes overcomes the Kantian
bifurcation of subject and object, it fails to address another dichotomy remaining in Jungian thought, the split between the conscious and the unconscious psyche. Might this remaining vestige of ‘Enlightened’ dualism be overcome? Jung as well as Hegelians urge us beyond “Enlightened” epistemological concepts into authentic relation with extra-human life and world. However Kantian position adopts Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object which is in contradiction to Jung’s thesis, that the only remedy of the modern spiritual problem is restoration of contact (communication) with profound sources of psychic life. Hegel’s philosophy strives for overcoming of Enlightenment subject-object concept without taking recourse to participation mystique. In this respect it is closer to Jung. B. Eckman (1986, p. 88-99).


Both Jung and Schopenhauer admit that Locke was right in his attack on innate ideas. Within Locke’s philosophy idea is a mental representation of material reality and that is why they can be learned just from experience.

Considering imagination and its role in cognitive process, Paul Kugler considers Kant heir and follower of Giordano Bruno: “Kant (...) established a new ground within the human mind, but transcendent to the knowing subject. Two hundred years earlier, a similar view of images had led to Bruno being burnt at the stake” (p. 84). In another place: “Bruno, a sixteenth-century hermetic philosopher, dramatically revised the traditional reproductive view of image by going so far as to suggest that human imaging was the source of the thought itself! This was, of course, an extremely radical idea at the time. For Bruno, imaging procedes and indeed creates reason” (KUNGLER, 2008, p. 81).

“few responsible figures in psychoanalysis would be disturbed today if an analyst were to present views identical to Jung’s in 1913”. (ROAZEN, 1976, p. 272). A. Samuels notes that “(...) one can see that Jung had a remarkable capacity to intuit the themes and areas with which late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century psychology would be concerned: gender; race; nationalism; cultural analysis; the perseverance, reappearance, and socio-political power of religious mentality in an apparently irreligious epoch; the unending search for meaning...” (2008, p. 4). Andrew Samuels also states twelve psychoanalytic topics where Jung can be seen as precursor of contemporary post-Freudian analysis (2008, p. 1-15).
Edward Edinger writes about ego-Self axis in introductory chapters of his book *Ego and Archetype* (1972); “The opposites constitute the most basic anatomy of the psyche. The flow of libido, or psychic energy, is generated by the polarization of opposites in the same way as electricity flows between the positive and negative poles of an electrical circuit (...). The opposites are truly the dynamo of the psyche.” (EDINGER, 1994, p. 11-12); Andrew Samuels proposes criticism of Jung’s fundamental oppositionalism (1985, p. 92-93).

Noteworthy is the absence of agreement regarding unity or plurality of “Jungian school”. Moreover, it seems there is no agreement regarding classification of different Jungian schools (classical, archetypal, developmental, psychoanalytical) either. There is not even agreement regarding use of terminology (imaginal psychology, archetypal psychology). There were objections regarding use of term “Post-Jungian” coming from Edward F. Edinger (1991) and Joseph Henderson (SAMUELS, 1985, p. 19-20).

Probably the second one was Hillman’s (and not just his because similar attacks did Giegerich and Fordham) attack to Erich Neumann’s concept of hero (as a archetypal metaphor for consciousness). For Neumann “ego-consciousness” has inevitably masculine features. Its development and growth is depends on its separation (without destroying the bond) from its feminine counterpart — Great Mother (but essentially, i.e. archetypally they are unseparable). Giegerich a Hillman viewed “heroic ego” as something inherently dangerous for imagination (too strong and dominant ego-heroic-image is threatening for plurality of other images) (SAMUELS, 1985, p. 78).

“Another reason why Hillman considers the Self dispensable is that it is not just any concept. In Jungian psychology, the Self is the ‘concept of concepts’. The Self is the Concept with a capital ‘C’. It is God with a capital ‘G’. It is Yahweh with a capital ‘Y’. Jung says that ‘in the place of a jealous God’ Freud substituted sexuality, which ten assumed ‘the role of a deus absconditus, a hidden or concealed god’. According to Jung, however, ‘the psychological qualities of the two rationally commensurable opposites — Yahweh and sexuality — remained the same’ — only the name was different. Similarly, in the place of God Jung substitutes the Self, which is just as jealous as Yahweh. Just as for Freud sexuality is God, for Jung the Self is God by another name.” (ADAMS, 2006).

“Because our psychic stuff is images, image-making is a via regia, a royal road to soul-making. The making of soul-stuff calls for dreaming, fantasying, imagining.
To live psychologically means to imagine things; to be in touch with soul means to live in sensuous connection with fantasy. To be in soul is to experience the fantasy in all realities and the basic reality of fantasy.” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 23).

“main contribution lies not so much in these ideas as in his radical, personified formulation of them” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 20).

Such an insight was probably natural consequence of 1) Jung’s personal philosophical stance apparent already at the time of his experiments with so-called occult phenomena, 2) Jung’s work with psychotics and 3) Jung’s own descend into the underworld where his encountered vast host inhabitants of unconscious.

For further reading recommend article by Michael Vannoy Adams (2004b).

J. Hillman borrowed that term from romanticist poets (William Blake, John Keats): “From this perspective the human adventure is a wandering through the vale of the world for the sake of making soul. Our life is psychological, and the purpose of life is to make psyche o fit, to find connection between life and soul” (1997, p. ix).

For further reading: (PEARCEY & THAXTON, 1994).

Nietzsche (especially in Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen — in English translated as Unmodern Observation or Untimely Meditations — published in 1870s, and later The Gay Science) rejected history as science and opened the question of destructive side of study of it. O. Spengler (radical refusal of causal reading of history) criticized ideal of positivist science as extremely naive. Spengler even rejects notion of causality and replaces it with “fate”. The same criticism leads towards ideal of unified science and espouses idea according to which all knowledge is culturally conditioned. Although nazi made use — at least partially — of them, they were not neither nazi nor pre-nazi thinkers and both can be considered forerunners of postmodern thinking.

I am referring to the development in mathematics and logics where non-classical systems were introduced (Lobachevskian geometry) and Newton theory proved to be unsufficient to explain all phenomena (Maxwell’s theories, Heisenberg’s and Bohr’s discoveries, Einstein’s theories).

“In the history of philosophy of modern times, his most marked opponent in this respect is thus probably Descartes” (HOYNINGEN-HUENE, 1994).

Cultural split Hillman is talking about results from each tradition’s attitude to image and imagery: 1) medieval and modern nominalists (no referentiality, flatus vocis) and de-personifiers (no personifying, no allegorizing), 2) Plato,
platonists, neo-platonists, medieval realists (personifiers, allegorizers, romantics).

25 Grof’s holotropic breathwork (and thesis of holotropic consciousness), Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, various astrological schools and theories (Hamburg school, Astrololocality astrology, theory of Huber’s method of Age Point, Cosmobiology, Astro-Carto-Graphy etc.), Tarnas’ archetypal astrology (cosmos is essentially archetypal), archetypal historiography, Chinese and Asclepian medicine (cure coming in the night with the dream), various forms of neopaganism etc.

26 As already noted Adolf Bastian, Lévy-Bruhl, Jung and ethnopsychology, ego of “primitive” is so week that it not only projects itself on the outer world but it is even identified with it. Like that they resemble children whose fylloegenetic cousins they are. Human “primatives” have very week sense of self. They experience themselves as outer objects — by means of transference of inner contents to the screen of the outer world. Identifying himself with the outer world, “primitive” identifies himself with the whole world around him, with his enviroment, starry sky, sun, moon, rivers, storms, winds. Such a state Lévy-Bruhl denominated as “patricipation mystique”. Whereas ancient or prehistoric people identified themselves extensively with outer world, modern people on the contrary identify themeselves too much with their own ego. Participation mystique played important role in the birth of ancient sciences (GAUQUELIN, 1969).

27 In the introduction Ellenberger charts discovery of primitive psychotherapy and work of German anthropologist Adolf Bastian (1826-1902) who experienced primitive healing personally in Guyana.

28 Stanislav Grof (1931), pioneer on the field of study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NOSC), inventor of “holotropic breathwork”, author of “holotropic consciousness” theory. Author of numerous books and experimentator who challenges paradigm of Newton-Cartesian paradigm in science.

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