REFLEXÃO E AGÊNCIA EPISTÊMICA: AS CRÍTICAS DE HILARY KORNBLITH AO PROJETO EPISTEMOLÓGICO DE ERNEST SOSA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i45.7576Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as críticas de Hilary Kornblith à Epistemologia das Virtudes de Ernest Sosa, principalmente, à sua noção de agência epistêmica reflexiva e ao papel do agente cognitivo no domínio epistêmico. A abordagem naturalista de Kornblith concentra suas críticas em identificar as limitações da habilidade reflexiva, concluindo que a reflexão não deve ser apontada como uma condição necessária para a agência epistêmica e que o projeto epistemológico de Sosa falha em encontrar um lugar distintivo para o conhecimento humano, não oferecendo uma resposta empiricamente plausível para o papel do agente no domínio epistêmico.
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