EMOTIONS AS NATURAL KINDS: A NATURALIST THEORY OF EMOTIONS IN JESSE PRINZ'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i45.7598Resumo
Naturalism refers to the ideas of emerging sciences and employ studies developed by Psychology, Physics and Biology. The many sorts of naturalism range from those advocating the use of science to inform about cognitive processes in order to fix them to those who advocate the end of any normative claim of philosophy. Jesse Prinz, Ruth Millikan and Hilary Kornblith are recognized naturalist philosophers, with differences in their approaches, and they use the concept of 'natural kinds' to undertake their philosophical projects. On the other hand, emotions have become an ascending subject in philosophy of mind, mostly because of doubts about theirs statuses as mental states, which are disputed as feelings, thoughts, perceptual or quasi-perceptual states, or, something totally different of that. As a result, different theories of emotions are flourishing in philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. In this text, the intent is to present the exemplary connection of metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind through the concept of natural kinds in Prinz’s philosophy of mind and theory of emotions. This intent will count with the useful Millikan’s and Kornblith’s analyses of the concept of natural kind.
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Referências
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