THE DISPUTE BETWEEN SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM AND INTERNALISM

Abstract

In this article, I aim to discuss the issue of meaning from the perspective of analytic philosophy, based on the approaches of Hilary Putnam and John Searle, in an attempt to contrast the theses of semantic externalism and internalism. Semantic externalism, advocated by Putnam, criticizes the traditional model of meaning, which, according to his argumentation, is internalist. Putnam argues that meanings are not in the minds of speakers, but rather depend much more on the external world, on natural and social reality. This means that reference is crucial for the meaning of terms. In contrast, Searle reacts by defending internalism against Putnam's attacks and argues that meaning is directly related to the intentionality of speech acts. As a result, for Searle, meanings are precisely in the minds of speakers. Given this philosophical dispute, the article aims to present the main points of Putnam's externalism and Searle's internalism, comparing their arguments and raising some problems on both sides. Finally, the article argues that internalism and externalism should not be seen as completely antagonistic and mutually exclusive positions, but that when combined they can provide a better understanding of semantic theory.