ANÁLISE DE UM ARGUMENTO ANTI-MOLINISTA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i50.11436Abstract
In this paper I intend to analyze an argument against Molinism developed by Perszyk (2003). According to this argument, if we start from the premise that we have no causal power over the antecedents of the true counterfactuals of freedom, it can be concluded that we have no causal control over the free actions specified in the consequents of these counterfactuals (and thus we have no free will). This anti-molinist argument is valid insofar as the transfer principle (known as the "beta rule") is also valid. However, I try to show that with a proper reinterpretation of the operators, this anti-molinist argument can be rejected, and thus Molinism cannot be criticized on this basis.
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References
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