A SENSAÇÃO (SENSATIO)

INFLUÊNCIAS CARTESIANAS E CAUSALIDADE ENTRE MENTE E CORPO NOS TEXTOS DE JUVENTUDE DE ESPINOSA

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the notion of sensation (sensatio) present in the young Spinoza's writings (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Short Treatise) and later abandoned by his mature works (Ethics, Theological-Political Treatise and Political Treatise) in favor of the notions of affection and affection. This analysis aim (i) to show young Spinoza's adherence to the Cartesian thesis of causality between mind and body, and, based on this causality (ii) to explain why, in paragraph 78 of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza considers that an isolated idea is nothing more than a sensation. Once the previous two steps have been carried out — and based on them — (iii) some considerations will be made about the nature of the fictitious idea, of the error, of the false idea and of the “dreaming with our eyes open”. Next, we intend (iv) to extract some consequences from the statement that “an isolated idea is nothing more than a sensation” combined with the statement that sensations arise from causes external to the mind, that is, from the body (TIE, § 84 ) and, finally, (v) highlight that Spinoza's juvenile texts can — and should — be read considering a causal relationship between the body and the mind.