IS REMEMBERING A KIND OF IMAGINING?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i47.8353Resumo
The scope of this paper is my objection to Michaelian’s claim, who advocates that the reliability condition is the mark which specify genuine rememberings. Against this view, I argue that this strategy is doomed to fail, since the relationship between memory and past has to be already in play and so everything which could count as reliable for a genuine remembering is itself a genuine remembering. If my argument is sound, the conclusion is that the appeal to reliability implies circularity, and so simulation theory cannot provide an explanatory account of the distinction between imagining, understood as a sort of confabulation, and genuine remembering.
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Referências
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