ANOTHER STRAND IN THE RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i47.9949Abstract
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to show, first, that there is a misconception underlying two opposing readings of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, notably Kripke’s sceptical reading and Baker and Hacker’s reading. I believe that the correct characterization of this misunderstanding is the first step towards the correct way to read the rule-following considerations, since these readings are still subject to a philosophical confusion that Wittgenstein wants to dissolve. Then I present a commentary on the rule-following considerations inspired by the so-called resolute reading, more precisely, by the idea that Wittgenstein’s main purpose is to undermine the philosophical illusion according to which we could contemplate our own practices from sideways on, that is, from a standpoint independent of all the human activities and reactions. In my reading I stress an often-neglected aspect of the rule-following considerations, namely the temporal aspect of language.
KEYWORDS: Rules; Scepticism; Agreement; Time.
RESUMO: Neste artigo, pretendo mostrar, em primeiro lugar, que há um equívoco subjacente a duas leituras opostas das considerações de Wittgenstein sobre seguir regras, a saber, a leitura cética de Kripke e a leitura de Baker e Hacker. Acredito que a caracterização correta desse mal-entendido é o primeiro passo em direção a uma maneira correta de compreender as considerações de seguir regras, uma vez que essas leituras estão sujeitas a uma confusão filosófica que Wittgenstein deseja dissolver. Em seguida, apresento um breve comentário das considerações sobre seguir regras inspirado na chamada leitura resoluta, mais precisamente, na ideia de que o principal objetivo de Wittgenstein é minar a ilusão filosófica segundo a qual poderíamos contemplar nossas próprias práticas de fora, isto é, de um ponto de vista independente de todas as atividades e reações humanas.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Regras; Ceticismo; Acordo; Tempo.
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References
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